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CHARACTER-DEPENDENT DUTY: 
AN ANABAPTIST APPROACH TO ETHICS 
Caleb Miller 
I propose a theory of moral obligation that is inspired by the way obligation 
has been understood in the Anabaptist tradition. I use the resources of the 
theory to explain and defend the appropriateness of the Anabaptist claim 
that Christian ethics is unique. I also use the theory to show that some of 
the standard objections to Christian pacifism, the most visibly distinctive 
feature of Anabaptist ethics, are misplaced when pacifism is understood as 
an application of the theory I defend. Finally, I suggest some theological 
and theoretical advantages this theory. 
In this paper, I shall articulate and defend a theory of moral obligation that 
is inspired by the way obligation has been understood in the main strands 
of the faith tradition which has its origins in sixteenth century Anabaptism. 
I intend this theory, which I shall call" Anabaptist Ethics,"! to be both faith-
ful to the spirit of moral views that have predominated in the Anabaptist 
tradition, and plausible, independent of Anabaptist assumptions. The key 
to understanding Anabaptist moral sensibilities, as I see it, is to understand 
the traditional Anabaptist claim that the ethic they espoused was, in 
important respects, appropriate only for Christians. I shall therefore begin 
by offering some evidence of Anabaptist moral sensibilities that are indica-
tive of the spirit I mean to capture. 
1. The Anabaptist Background 
The 1527 "Schleitheim Confession," probably the single most influential 
document in the Anabaptist tradition, says this, concerning the exercise of 
lethal force: 
We have been united as follows concerning the sword. The sword is 
an ordering of God outside the perfection of Christ. It punishes and 
kills the wicked, and guards and protects the good. In the [Hebrew] 
law the sword is established over the wicked for punishment and for 
death, and the secular rulers are established to wield the same. 
But within the perfection of Christ only the ban [excommunication] is 
used for the admonition and exclusion of the one who has sinned, 
without the death of the flesh, simply the warning and the command 
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to sin no more. 
Now many who do not understand Christ's will for us, will ask: 
whether a Christian mayor should use the sword against the wicked 
for protection and defense of the good, or for the sake of love. 
The answer is unanimously revealed: Christ teaches and commands 
us to learn from him, ... Now Christ says to the woman who was 
taken in adultery, not that she should be stoned according to the law 
of his Father (and yet he says 'what the Father commanded me, that I 
do') but with mercy and forgiveness and the warning to sin no more, 
says: 'Go, sin no more.' Exactly thus should we also proceed, accord-
ing to the rule of the ban.2 
The adherents to this confession insist that God proscribes for Christians 
(in this case, the exercise of lethal force) what he prescribed for pre-
Christian Hebrew believers and still ordains for secular rulers. Anabaptists 
made similar claims about the swearing of oaths, divorce and remarriage, 
participation in government, etc. That is, they claimed that God prohibits, 
for Christians, conduct, in these areas, that he wills (or permits) for others, 
and vice versa. The rationale for these distinctions has never been worked 
out by Anabaptists, in a systematically satisfactory way. It was enough for 
most traditional Anabaptists that the Scriptures amply attested to these 
distinctions along the lines they claimed. Notice that, in the ilSchleitheim 
Confession," it was enough to show that Jesus took their side of the matter 
despite the fact that he was very well aware that God had directed other-
wise in the Old Testament. 
There were, however, a variety of explanations offered here and there. 
For example, the early Anabaptists frequently claimed, as in this confes-
sion, that, as Christians, they were subject to "the perfection of Christ," i.e., 
they were obligated to live according to the ideal standards set by the life 
and teachings of Christ. The idea seemed to be that since Christians were 
"in Christ" the standard of their conduct was to be the perfection of Christ, 
whereas those not in Christ were" outside the perfection of Christ," that is, 
not subject to these ideal standards. The differences between the duties of 
Christians and those of non-Christians were sometimes attributed to the 
sin that prevailed in non-Christian communities. Thus, according to the 
"Schleitheim Confession," the prescription of lethal force was appropriate 
in both of the relevant non-Christian communities because of the presence 
in them of the sort of wickedness that needs to be kept in check by the 
threat of deadly force. But, on other matters, such as divorce, sin was the 
occasion of divine concession to human weakness.3 A document, repre-
senting ten different Anabaptist denominations, was commissioned in the 
Second World War to defend conscientious objection to military service. It 
claimed that the differences between the New Testament and various 
divine revelations in the Old Testament on such matters as, "polygamy, 
divorce, concubinage, war, retaliation, and so forth" was that this revela-
tion "was in every period more or less adapted to the spiritual level and 
the spiritual capacity of the people to whom it was given," but that ilwhat 
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has now been revealed through the incarnate Christ [is] the final standard 
and practice for the Christian."4 Elsewhere, in response to the question "Is 
it possible to live here and now according to the teachings of Jesus in the 
Sermon on the Mount?", the document says, "It is not possible except for 
those who are born again and who are willing to follow Christ and bear 
their cross after him."S 
II. Moral Obligation 
I would now like to suggest a theory of moral obligation that both 
makes sense of the Anabaptist claim that the duties of Christians are differ-
ent from those of non-Christians, and makes sense of the hints at 
Anabaptist explanations for such a state of affairs. Let me begin by making 
two basic claims that I take to be plausible on Anabaptist theological 
assumptions: 
(a) Moral obligation is determined by God's will, and 
(b) God's will, and therefore moral obligation, is relative to human 
character. 
A. Divine Will 
I take (a) to be the less controversial of these two claims. What I have in 
mind is the familiar view that it is God's will which obligates people to do 
what they are morally obligated to do. There are, of course, many different 
senses in which God can be said to will something, and not all of them are 
directly relevant for moral obligation. What I have in mind is the view that 
it is our obligation to perform all and only those actions that God would 
prescribe for us if he were to instruct us on the actions in question. More 
precisely, I take the connection between moral obligation and God's will to 
be the following: 
(1) An action, A, is morally obligatory for a person, P, in a set of cir-
cumstances, C, iff: God would prescribe A for P in C, if God 
were to instruct P with respect to A in C, and 
(2) A is morally wrong for P in C, iff: God would proscribe A for P 
in C, if God were to instruct P with respect to A in C. 
B. The Relativity of Obligation to Character 
In order to understand (b), we will need to take a brief detour into theology 
to make some claims that I shall not defend, but which I intend to be plau-
sible, if not entirely uncontroversial, on broadly Christian grounds-not 
just on Anabaptist assumptions. 
1. Theological background 
God, according to Christian faith, created humanity. Moreover, he cre-
ated human beings to fulfill the purposes for he which created humanity. 
Taken together, these purposes constitute the human telos, the fulfillment 
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of which would constitute achievement of the human good. The primary 
purpose for which human beings were created is to love God. Part, but not 
all, of what it is for human beings to love God is for them to love each 
other. The whole of what God intended people to do expresses love for 
God, either by expressing love for other human beings, or by expressing it 
in some way not reducible to love of human beings. 
Human sin has, however, seriously undermined the achievement of 
those purposes. It has done so in two ways. It has directly undermined 
the achievement of our telos in so far as human sin is constituted by a refusal 
to cooperate with God's purposes for humanity. It has also undermined 
the fulfillment of our purpose by so corrupting human nature that human 
beings have become incapable of achieving God's purposes for them. 
Redemption is God's effort to save humanity from sin. For ethics, the prin-
cipal expression of this is God's effort to help human beings to become 
people who love God and love their fellow human beings. 
2. The redemptiveness of moral obligations 
Morality is, I suggest, intended by God to redeem us, i.e., to restore us to 
the life for which we were created by God. Our moral obligations are those 
action-guiding principles that are most redemptive for us. They are obliga-
tory because they are the principles that God, given his redemptive purpose 
for morality, would prescribe for us. Redemptive, and therefore obligatory, 
principles are those that best promote the fulfillment of our telos. Principles 
promote the fulfillment of our telos by tending to improve the degree to 
which our lives approximate lives lived in accordance with the love of God 
and the love of others human beings.6 In short, it is our obligation to follow 
God's will. It is God's will that we follow those action-guiding principles 
that are redemptive. Redemptive principles are those most likely to 
improve our conformity to the love of God and others. They tend to 
improve our conformity to the love of God and others, directly, by encour-
aging actions more closely approximating it, and, indirectly, by contribut-
ing, through habituation, to the improvement of our character. An 
improvement of our character, as I intend it here, is any improvement in the 
degree of our inclination to live in conformity to the love of God and others. 
One obvious way in which principles can fail to be redemptive is by 
requiring too little conformity to the love of God and others. For example, 
principles which permitted us to kill anyone whom we found unattractive 
would clearly not be redemptive because they required too little conformi-
ty to the love of others. 
It is tempting to think that the principles which are obviously the most 
redemptive are the principles, "Love God" and "Love others," or perhaps 
better the single principle, "Act only in ways that are most loving toward 
God and most loving toward others." After all, any improvement in the 
degree to which one conforms to that principle is an improvement in confor-
mity to the love of God and others. But that way of viewing redemptiveness 
considers only our telos and ignores our fallenness. Consider a philanthropic 
billionaire, who nevertheless enjoys a lavish lifestyle. He uses his wealth to 
the considerable benefit of those less fortunate than he partly because he 
takes himself to be obligated to provide such assistance. Let us suppose that, 
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if he gave all but $35,000 of his annual income to charity, the benefit to others 
would be maximal. But his character and his love of luxury is such that he 
cannot constructively aspire to live on only $35,000 per year, i.e., he is unable 
to improve his conformity to the love of God and others by such aspiration. 
If he believed it to be his obligation to live on only $35,000 per year, it would 
tend to corrupt him by habituating him to the violation of his obligations. 
On the other hand, prescribing some lesser degree of generosity to which he 
can constructively aspire would be redemptive for him since it would tend 
to directly improve the degree to which his actions benefitted others, and 
because those actions would tend, through habituation, to improve the 
degree of generosity in his character. So action-guiding principles can fail to 
be redemptive, not only by requiring too little conformity to the love of God 
and others, but also by requiring too much such conformity. 
We are now in a position to see how the claim that God's will for us is 
redemptive implies that God's will is relative to character. Moral redemp-
tion is the project of restoring fallen human beings to the love of God and 
others. Which principles are redemptive, and therefore obligatory, 
depends not only on our generic fallenness, but also on the specific and 
variable degree and type of corruption from which our character suffers. 
Thus, for example, it would violate the obligations of a pedophile, but not 
those of most people, to operate a childcare facility. It would similarly be 
wrong for a kleptomaniac to work in a mint or a bank. In each case, the 
relevant employment would tend to diminish the conformity to the love of 
God and others of the person in question, by making it much more likely 
that he would harm others and corrupt his character. 
On the other hand, the obligations of Mother Teresa to provide assis-
tance to others were probably greater than those of a typical American 
teenager. If Mother Teresa had believed herself to be obligated to provide 
the degree of assistance to others that she did in fact provide, it would have 
tended to improve the degree to which her life conformed to the love of 
God and others. The teenager would likely be in a situation analogous to 
that of the billionaire. That is, his character would probably not enable him 
to aspire constructively to provide that sacrificially for others. 
Let me now be more precise in spelling out the relationship between 
redemptiveness and obligation. Notice that, in the examples I offered, 
redemptiveness depended very crucially on that to which the people in these 
examples could, or could not, constructively aspire. To get clearer about 
what it is to constructively aspire to a moral principle, let me begin by clari-
fying what it is to aspire, in the relevant sense, to the fulfillment of an action-
guiding principle. 
(3) A person, P, aspires to fulfill an action-guiding principle, R, iff: 
(i) P believes that she is morally obligated to fulfill R, and 
(ii) P seeks to fulfill R, in order to fulfill her moral obligation. 
One can fail to aspire to fulfill a principle either by failing to believe that 
she is obligated to follow it, or by failing to seek to fulfill it for the right rea-
son. Whether or not someone aspires to fulfill a principle, is strictly a mat-
ter of her motives. To aspire constructively requires more. 
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(4) A person, P, constructively aspires to fulfill an action-guiding 
principle, K iff: 
(i) P aspires to fulfill R, and 
(ii) P's aspiring to fulfill K tends to improve her conformity 
to the love of God and others. 
One can fail to aspire constructively to fulfill a principle in two basic ways, 
by failing to aspire to it, or by aspiring to it without its tending to improve 
the moral excellence of her life. 
Although the constructive aspiration to, and the redemptiveness of, an 
action-guiding principle are closely related, they are not equivalent. 
Constructive aspiration to a principle is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
redemptiveness. If it were necessary, a person could, simply by refusing to 
aspire to a principle, guarantee that he is not obligated to fulfill it, even if 
the aspiration would be both possible, given his character, and constructive 
for him. But surely if God were to instruct such a person redemptively, he 
would prescribe the fulfillment of such a principle. If it nevertheless failed 
to contribute to his redemption because he refused to aspire to it, it would 
not be because the principle was unredemptive for him, but because his 
response was unredemptive. The redemptiveness of a principle, for a per-
son, requires only his ability to aspire constructively to it, not his actually 
aspiring to it. 
To see why constructive aspiration is not sufficient for redemptiveness, 
consider the following example. Mary slanders other people whenever she 
feels like it. She could improve her conformity to the love of God and oth-
ers by aspiring to fulfill either of the following action-guiding principles. 
(Rl) Slander others iff doing so is beneficial in some way to oneself. 
(R2) Never slander others under any circumstances. 
(Rl) and (R2) are incompatible with each other, i. e., there are possible 
circumstances in which it would be impossible to fulfill one of them 
without violating the other. Let us suppose that aspiring to fulfill (R2) 
would tend to improve her conformity to the love of God and others 
more strongly than would aspiring to fulfill (R1). If constructive aspira-
tion were sufficient for redemptiveness, Mary could nevertheless make 
it redemptive, and therefore obligatory, for her to slander others, for her 
own economic benefit, despite the fact that she could constructively 
aspire to avoid it. 
The correct relationship between redemptiveness and constructive aspi-
ration is, I suggest, the following: 
(5) An action-guiding principle, R, is redemptive for a person, P, 
iff: 
(i) P can constructively aspire to fulfill R, and 
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(ii) There is no action-guiding principle, N, incompatible with 
R, such that, P's aspiring to fulfill N would tend to 
improve P's conformity to the love of God and others as 
strongly as would P's aspiring to fulfill R. 
In other words, a principle is redemptive for a person if he can construc-
tively aspire to it, and doing so would improve his conformity to the love 
of God and others more than would aspiring to any incompatible princi-
ple? 
What remains now is to indicate more precisely the connection I have 
already claimed between redemptiveness and God's will. 
(6) If God were to instruct a person, P, with respect to an action A, 
in circumstances, C, he would prescribe A for P in C, iff: 
(i) There is an action-guiding principle, R, which is redemp-
tive for P in C, and 
(ii) Performing A is required in order for P to fulfill R in C. 
(7) If God were to instruct a person, P, with respect to an action A, 
in circumstances, C, he would proscribe A for P in C, iff: 
(i) There is an action-guiding principle, R, which is redemp-
tive for P in C, and 
(ii) P's performing A in C would violate R. 
To summarize, God would prescribe actions conforming to redemptive 
principles and proscribe those violating redemptive principles. And, as I 
claimed in (1) and (2) above, we are obligated to perform those actions God 
would prescribe and obligated to avoid those God would proscribe. Our 
obligations, in short, are to perform all those actions required by redemp-
tive principles and to avoid all those actions violating such principles. 
I have not yet addressed what might seem to be a crucial question, To 
what principles should one aspire? The answer is no different from what it 
would be on any moral theory. One should aspire to abide by those princi-
ples one is obligated to follow. It might seem, however, that this answer is 
circular. After all, aspiration plays a key role in my account of what makes 
a principle obligatory. But this problem is only apparent. A principle's 
being obligatory, on my account, does require that it be possible to aspire 
to it. But, whether it is obligatory depends on whether it would be better-
more conducive to our moral redemption-to aspire to it than to aspire to 
any incompatible principle. So lmderstood, there is nothing viciously cir-
cular about the relationship of obligation to aspiration. We ought to aspire 
to those principles the aspiration to which would be most conducive to our 
moral redemption. 
Let me summarize the claims of Anabaptist Ethics more informally. We 
are obligated to perform all those actions which God wills that we perform. 
God wills, in the relevant sense, that we perform all, and only, those 
actions which it would be redemptive for God to prescribe for us. We are 
similarly obligated not to perform any action that it would be redemptive 
for God to proscribe for us. Whether it would be redemptive for God to 
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prescribe (or proscribe) an action for us, depends, in part, on our character. 
3. Communal constraints on redemptiveness 
Thus far, I have been treating the relationship of obligation to redemp-
tiveness as though it were an entirely individual matter. It, of course, is 
not. This should not surprise the Christian who believes that the good life 
so centrally involves our relationships with others. What an individual 
does affects, for good or ill, the dispositions of others in the community to 
which she belongs. Moral practices are, to a very great extent, socially sus-
tained. Whether an action-guiding principle, for a person, serves God's 
morally redemptive purposes is determined, in large part, by what prac-
tices are socially sustainable in the communities to which that person 
belongs. Whether a practice requires too much or too little conformity to 
the love of God and others, depends, in part, on what the character of 
members of her communities is. The character of community members 
affects what principles they can collectively to aspire constructively, that is, 
it affects what principles they can aspire to in such a way that a communi-
ty's collective conformity to the love of God and others tends to be 
improved by such aspiration. 
Suppose, for example, that a member of the board of directors of a not-
for-profit hospital is married to a contractor who is bidding on a major con-
struction project at the hospital. Even if the board member were quite 
capable of supporting the bid that is best for the hospital, she would be 
obligated not to participate in the decision. The explanation of this is that 
God would proscribe such participation because it would violate God's 
redemptive purposes. In our society such participation would likely con-
tribute to a practice that would harm the interests and character of people 
in that society. Other people would be encouraged to participate in deci-
sions involving potential conflicts of interest. In American society, the risk 
is unacceptably great that such people would have the sort of character 
that is susceptible to the abuse of their power, to the harm of others, the 
corruption of their character, and the encouragement of yet others to vio-
late duty in their own interests. Even if discharging one's fiduciary respon-
sibilities in conflict of interest situations were an individually sustainable 
practice, it would be a violation of her obligations. For, given the character 
of her community members, it is not a socially sustainable practice because 
it is not a practice to which the members of her community can collectively 
aspire constructively. 
It is not only the effects on the character of the community as a whole 
that is relevant. The effects on the character of individuals influenced by 
one's actions is also relevant. If one is sharing a meal with an alcoholic 
friend who is struggling with great difficulty to avoid the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, it would probably be wrong to order the friend's 
favorite alcoholic drink. Such an action would be much too likely to cor-
rupt his character by undermining his resolve to avoid a very destructive 
practice. 
This social complication suggests a possible problem. What is one's 
obligation when there is a conflict between what is socially redemptive and 
what is individually redemptive? Such conflicts, it seems to me, are fortu-
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nately impossible. There are, of course, situations in which there is a con-
flict between what is redemptive for one's community, or individuals with-
in it, and what would be redemptive for oneself, were it not for the character 
of others. Our board member, for example, would not have had the oblig-
ation to avoid conflicts of interest, were it not for the weaknesses of mem-
bers of his community. But, given the character of his community, acting in 
the moral interests of the community is individually redemptive because it 
improves that individual's conformity to the love of others. His serving 
the moral interests of his community is a more loving course of action than 
ignoring those interests would be. In cases, such as that of the pedophile, 
in which the community's character is morally superior to that of the indi-
vidual, there is again no conflict, all things considered, between what is 
individually and socially redemptive. What is individually redemptive for 
the pedophile is the proscription of unmonitored childcare. It is also 
socially redemptive for the pedophile to avoid such activity since such 
avoidance is less likely to result in the corruption of others than any alter-
native to it. 
III. Enabling Grace, and the Uniqueness of Christian Obligation 
Thus far, I have considered only natural mechanisms of redemption. 
But, on a Christian view of things, redemption also has a supernatural 
dimension. Our character is subject, not only to such causal factors as habit-
uation and social influence, but also to God's enabling grace. It is that 
supernatural dimension which explains the uniqueness of Christian obliga-
tion that the Anabaptist tradition has insisted upon. Because of the salvific 
work of Christ, the Christian community has, through faith in Him, an 
access to the enabling resources of the Holy Spirit, that was not previously 
open to the people of God, and that is not generally open to those outside 
the community of Christian faith. Christians are also graciously empow-
ered to follow the will of God by the supernatural revelation of God in 
Christ, in the Holy Scriptures and in the Christian community, including 
the revelation of God's prescriptions for his followers. I suggest that the 
availability of these resources makes unnecessary the sort of compromises 
with the love of God and others that the obligations of those without these 
resources reflect. These divine resources make it possible, therefore, for 
members of the Christian community and for that community as a whole to 
aspire constructively to follow the principle, "Act only in those ways that 
are most loving toward God and most loving toward others."B That such 
constructive aspiration to this principle is possible makes this principle 
redemptive for Christians. Its observance in the Christian community also 
serves God's redemptive purposes by making it possible for God to display 
to others, through the Christian community, the fulfillment of human pur-
poses to a degree not otherwise possible. For these reasons, God would 
prescribe it to the Christian community, even though it would not serve his 
redemptive purposes to prescribe it for those outside that community. The 
"perfection of Christ" is a perfection in the standards of conduct achieved 
by Christ to which the Christian community can constructively aspire. 
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It might seem that this Anabaptist distinction between ethics w1der the 
perfection of Christ and the lesser requirements for others is similar to the 
distinction in Catholic moral theology between precepts and the counsels 
of perfection. There are, however, important differences. The counsels of 
perfection, such as the counsel to undertake celibacy and voluntary pover-
ty, are, in Catholic theology, morally optional, and properly the vocation of 
only a relatively few Christians. They are considered something like good 
advice for the person who is interested in doing her best to serve God. 
Only the precepts apply to all Christians. However, the rigorous require-
ments of love in the perfection of Christ are, in the Anabaptist tradition, 
not merely optional or intended for a worthy few. They are obligatory and 
intended for all Christians. The reason for this is that the resources of grace 
that make the aspiration to such standards constructive are available to all 
believers and are such that they are appropriated by the faithful response 
of any believer to her calling. 
IV. An Illustration: Christian Pacifism 
The theory of moral obligation I have been developing can help us to 
see why pacifism, the absolute refusal to kill any human being intentional-
ly, is thought by Anabaptists to be the obligation of all Christians. Given 
an Anabaptist understanding of what it is to act in love toward another 
person, killing that person intentionally can never be the loving way to 
treat her, although it may be an expression of love for a person other than 
the victim.9 Since the Christian obligation is to love everyone without qual-
ification, Anabaptists have taken the obligation to love others to preclude 
intentionally killing any of them. It would serve God's redemptive pur-
poses to prescribe pacifism for the Christian community. Anabaptist 
Ethics also explains why Anabaptists have traditionally denied that paci-
fism is an obligation of those outside the Christian commW1ity. It would 
violate God's redemptive purposes to prescribe pacifism for human com-
munities whose members could not collectively aspire constructively to 
pacifism, and for whom the threat of deadly force was necessary to restrain 
the evil of some of their members. 
My reconstruction of traditional Anabaptist ethics makes it clear that 
some of the most obvious objections to pacifism do not count against tradi-
tional Anabaptist pacifism. Consider the frequently expressed claim that 
there could never be a successful pacifist nation-state, since, without 
recourse to deadly force, there is no effective way to restrain the evil of its 
worst citizens and adversaries. Anabaptists have traditionally agreed. My 
theory makes moral sense of their view. For those reasons, among others, 
the prescription by God of pacifism for nation-states would not be redemp-
tive, whereas, given Anabaptist understandings of love and enabling 
grace, it would be redemptive for God to prescribe pacifism for Christians. 
Elizabeth Anscombe has argued against the moral appropriateness of 
pacifism by suggesting that when people regard it as "ideal," it has delete-
rious effects. "Unable to follow that," they go "the whole hog" and aban-
don moral restraint altogether in their waging of war.lO It should be obvi-
ous that her objection does not count against the sort of pacifism I have 
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been attributing to the Anabaptist tradition. If she is right, then the people 
of whom she writes cannot constructively aspire to pacifism. To this, the 
Anabaptist pacifist can reply, "Exactly, and that is why such people are not 
obligated to be pacifists. My only claim is that Christians, who by God's 
grace can collectively aspire constructively to pacifism, are obligated to be 
pacifists. " 
v. Advantages of Anabaptist Ethics 
Much work could fruitfully be done to clarify further the theory I have 
been explicating and to make it more plausible. Much of what needs to be 
done involves integrating it into a plausible moral epistemology. There are 
unanswered questions, for example, about how an atheist could be either 
morally excellent or insightful, without loving God at all, recognizing that 
the love of God is the most basic standard of moral excellence, or under-
standing that moral obligation is determined by God's will. l1 As it stands 
my account of the human telos remains radically incomplete. What it is to 
love God and to love each other will depend not just on the fact that we are 
to love God and others but also on facts about the specific nature with 
which, and purpose for which, we were created by God. For example, that 
we are sexual beings, that we experience emotions, that we are capable of 
reasoning, and that we depend on food for survival, are all important in 
determinjng what it is live a life devoted to the love of God and what it is to 
seek the interests of others. There are, I am convinced, plausible ways to 
clarify matters like these, but in spite of this unfinished business, we can 
already recognize some of the considerable advantages of Anabaptist Ethics. 
The first advantage is the excellent fit of Anabaptist Ethics with the 
Biblical narrative. When the Christian Scriptures are read through the lens of 
this theory, they make more sense. This is not the place to develop the idea 
thoroughly, but Old Testament anticipations of the New Testamentl2 and 
especially New Testament treatments of differences with the Old Testament, 
that are otherwise difficult to understand, seem to me to make perfect sense 
on Anabaptist Ethics.13 Nowhere is this clearer than in Jesus' explanation for 
the difference between his teaching on divorce and that of Moses, whose 
writings he obviously treated as inspired by God. He says, "Moses permit-
ted you to divorce ... because your hearts were hard. But it was not this way 
from the beginning."14 Here, Jesus seems to claim that, with respect to mar-
riage, God's will for Israel was a redemptive compromise with his original 
purposes. The redemptiveness of the compromise was due to the fact that 
their "hearts were hard," a deficiency in their character. Despite that, Jesus 
prescribes, for his followers, confomuty to the original ideal. 
Anabaptist Ethics permits one to accept the view that the Old Testament 
is the word of God, together with the view that divine commands obligate 
us, without committing us to morally approve the manifestly un-Christian 
practices of the Old Testament that are there represented as commanded 
by God. Indeed, if I read the Scriptures through these eyes, I wonder how 
anyone could ever have claimed to find revealed there that "God holds 
people of all times and places accountable to one and the same moral 
law."15 It seems obvious to me that the moral law which required married 
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men to procreate by their brothers' widows,16 and permitted polygamy and 
easy divorce,!7 is quite different from the Christian obligation to restrict 
sexual intercourse to life-long monogamous marriage. The soldiers of 
Israel were held morally accountable, from time to time, to a requirement 
that they kill every living being in a given city, and their king was severely 
punished for his failure to comply. IS Such a requirement seems obviously 
incompatible with any plausible account of the moral law to which 
Christians are held accountable. 
Another advantage of Anabaptist Ethics is that it gives us a plausible 
way to understand cultural diversity in moral attitudes. If one is used to the 
idea that the only objective moral obligations there could be are embodied 
in 1/ one and the same moral law" binding on people of all times and places, 
the enormous variety, among cultures, of incompatible attitudes about what 
people ought to do, can be disheartening. The choices seem to be either 
moral anti-realism, the view that there are no objective obligations, or moral 
skepticism, the view that human beings, in general, have no reliable way of 
acquiring moral knowledge. Anabaptist Ethics, on the other hand, can 
explain, in ways that I hope are now obvious, how there can be an enor-
mous diversity in the objective obligations of different cultures owing to dif-
ferences in what is redemptive from culture to culture. 
Anabaptist Ethics does not entail that there are no obligations common 
to everyone. The obligation not to torture innocent children purely for the 
fun of it seems like a good candidate for such an obligation. It is hard to 
see how the permission to engage in such torture could be redemptive for 
anyone, regardless of how depraved he is. But it does give us reason to 
expect differences, from person to person and community to community, 
in even their most fundamental obligations. For example, although the 
unconditional love of others is among the fundamental principles of 
Christian obligation, it is not a universal human obligation if, as I argued 
above, it is a standard of conduct so demanding that some people cannot 
constructively aspire to it. 
One more advantage before I conclude. This approach to obligations 
suggests a way to clear up a puzzle about supererogation. Those people 
who perform actions that seem most obviously supererogatory usually 
deny that their actions are supererogatory. It is not unusual for them to 
sincerely say that they were only doing their duty when they do what 
seems to be heroically beyond the call of duty to most people. We seem 
forced to choose between giving up on the notion of supererogation or 
denying that the morally best members of a community are as morally 
insightful as the morally average. My hunch is that the morally average 
members of a community consider those actions supererogatory that they 
recognize to be morally excellent but to which they cannot constructively 
aspire, and in that case they are, according to Anabaptist Ethics, 
supererogatory for them. The people who perform those actions, on the 
other hand, can constructively aspire to their performance; so they are, as 
their moral intuitions attest, obligated to perform them. 
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Mennonite Central Committee, 1943), p. 47. 
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Anabaptist Theory of Moral Obligation," The Mennonite Quarterly Review 71 
(October 1997) pp. 588-589, 592-593. 
9. I understand that this Anabaptist assumption is highly controversial. 
But since the point of this article is to defend Anabaptist Ethics, not the pacifist 
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1991) p. 105. 
16. Deut. 25:5-10. 
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